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INTRODUCTION
State and local governments across the nation are frustrated with
rising numbers of undocumented immigrants' in their communities
and with the federal government's failure to enact comprehensive
immigration reform. This frustration has compelled them to
undertake new measures on their own to confront problems they
perceive as immigration-related. In North Carolina, for example,
* Copyright © 2008 by Jason G. Idilbi.
1. For the purposes of this Recent Development, the phrase "undocumented
immigrant" will apply to those who are unlawfully present in the United States and who
are subject to deportation by virtue of their unlawful presence in the United States. The
references to Hispanics contained within this paper simply reflect the fact that the vast
majority of undocumented immigrants are Hispanics. See generally JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS, BACKGROUND BRIEFING PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON
IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUTURE (June 14, 2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/46.pdf (describing demographic data and socioeconomic characteristics of
undocumented immigrants). Though I do not intend to suggest that all undocumented
immigrants are Hispanic, Hispanics are certainly the undocumented immigrants who
receive the bulk of the attention within the context of the issues discussed in this paper.
As such, most of the materials and data cited within this paper focus on Hispanic
undocumented immigrants specifically.
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several communities have contributed to an emerging national trend
by adopting local ordinances that target community interaction with
undocumented immigrants. Some ordinances require all public
signage to be in English, while others forbid employers from
employing, or landlords from leasing to, undocumented immigrants!
At the state level, North Carolina has also responded by recently
passing measures that forbid the issuance of driver's licenses to
immigrants who cannot prove documented status.3 Advocates for
immigration rights and proponents of stricter immigration controls
continue to intensely debate the merits and drawbacks of state and
local ordinances.
In the midst of the debate over local ordinances, North Carolina
counties have begun to participate in yet another trend of local
involvement in immigration control: employing an Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") initiative for local officers to enter the
business of immigration enforcement.4 The initiatives are referred to
as 287(g) agreements, after the relevant section was adopted into the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") by 1996 amendments to
the Act.5 Section 287(g) permits local governments to enter into
agreements with ICE, whereby ICE will deputize local law
enforcement agents to conduct federal immigration enforcement.
2. Among these North Carolina communities are the cities of Asheville, Lincolnton,
Landis, and Mint Hill, and the counties of Gaston, Forsyth, Davidson, Lincoln, Rowan,
and Mecklenburg. See generally Mai Thi Nguyen, Anti-Immigration Ordinances in NC:
Ramifications for Local Governance and Planning, 32 CAROLINA PLAN. J., Summer 2007,
at 36 (describing ordinances in North Carolina that require public signage to be in English,
that deny services and benefits to undocumented immigrants, and that impose employer
and landlord sanctions).
3. Act of May 23, 2007, ch. 56, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 47 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-7(f)). At this time, only Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington continue to issue driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants. See Daniel
C. Vock, Tighter License Rules Hit Illegal Immigrants, STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 24, 2007,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=234828.
4. For a description of the history, mission, and operations of ICE, see generally U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About Us, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
5. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), which amended § 287 of the INA (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000)). The 287(g) agreements are also known as Memoranda of
Understanding ("MOU") or Memoranda of Agreement ("MOA"). See Carrie L. Arnold,
Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to
Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 115 & n.14 (2007). For the
purposes of consistency, I will simply refer to them as "287(g) agreements" throughout
this Recent Development.
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ICE trains, certifies, and supervises the local officers in their new
roles as immigration officers.6
One reason that North Carolina counties may be attracted to the
implementation of a 287(g) agreement is because these agreements
have not yet been subject to a legal challenge, whereas some local
ordinances have been found unconstitutional.7 Quite simply, a 287(g)
agreement does not aim to regulate immigration and immigrants as do
the local ordinances, as much as enforce immigration law, a crucial
distinction that avoids the legal concerns pertaining to the local
ordinances.8 However, like local ordinances, a 287(g) agreement has
the potential to alleviate some of the social concerns attributed-
rightly or wrongly-to the rise in undocumented immigration, such as
the public expense caused by undocumented immigrant consumption
of educational, health care, and social services and an increase in the
crime rate.' Nevertheless, counties should keep in mind that a 287(g)
agreement may cause potentially constitutionally-problematic racial
profiling practices, and may also negatively affect community
6. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., Fact
Sheets: Section 287(g), Immigration and Nationality Act; Delegation of Immigration
Authority (June 22, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/070622factsheet287g
progover.htm [hereinafter ICE Fact Sheet].
7. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The City of
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, attempted to regulate the presence and employment of
undocumented aliens through the Illegal Immigration and Relief Act Ordinance,
Hazleton, Pa., 2006-18 (July 13, 2006), as amended by the Tenant Registration Ordinance,
Hazleton, Pa., 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006) and the Official English Ordinance, Hazleton, Pa.,
2006-19 (Sept. 21, 2006). The court found first that federal law preempted the local
regulations, which unconstitutionally violated the Supremacy Clause by "disrupt[ing] a
well-established federal scheme for regulating the presence and employment of
immigrants in the United States." Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 554. The court further
found that the Hazleton ordinances violated procedural due process by penalizing
landlords, tenants, employers, and employees because they did not provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard, stating that "[t]he United States Constitution provides due
process protections to all persons." Id. The court also struck down the regulations for
burdening the rights of illegal aliens to contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and found that the
City of Hazleton acted ultra vires when it created a private cause of action for a dismissed
employee and "exceeded its police powers by enacting unconstitutional ordinances." Id.
While many cities and towns considering ordinances similar to Hazleton's
dropped their efforts after the decision for fear of litigation, a number of local ordinances
have been upheld since. For example, judges have upheld an Arizona law that imposed
penalties on employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants and a similar ordinance in
Valley Park, Missouri. See Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at A22. "[I]n an even more sweeping ruling," a judge in
Oklahoma dismissed a case challenging a law that required state contractors to verify the
immigration status of new employees, stating that "immigrants should not be able to bring
their claims to court because they were living in the country in violation of the law." Id.
8. See supra note 7.
9. See infra Section III.
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policing, 0 criminal enforcement, and local economies. Regardless of
their views on the issue of undocumented immigration, North
Carolinians should be concerned about and attentive to these
consequences before the use of 287(g) agreements spreads even more
widely in the state.
This Recent Development will briefly discuss the history of
287(g) agreements and the gradual implementation-and recent
proliferation-of agreements between local governments and ICE on
a national level. It will then describe and distinguish the two common
types of agreements, focus on 287(g) agreements in North Carolina,
and report the present situation in the counties that have adopted
them, and then argue that meaningful analysis is needed to
understand the benefits and drawbacks of 287(g) agreements. This
analysis will consider the local impact that 287 (g) is having in the
counties in which an agreement has been implemented-
consequences that affect not only immigrants but the community at
large. Finally, to the extent that 287(g) agreements seem to be a
permanent feature of local enforcement of federal immigration law in
North Carolina, this Recent Development will suggest a way that
counties can best tailor the agreements with ICE to promote the
desired enforcement while avoiding the more problematic features of
the agreements.
Ultimately, this Recent Development concludes that North
Carolina counties should not implement a 287(g) agreement because
the negative consequences of 287(g) agreements outweigh their
positive effects. In particular, the negative consequences include
harm to community policing, a reduction in criminal enforcement of
high-priority crimes, and a detrimental impact on local economies
caused by mass immigration enforcement and subsequent deportation
of undocumented immigrants. If a county nevertheless decides to
implement a 287(g) agreement, it should first take steps to minimize
the harmful impact through the use of a "conviction" model of
enforcement that would trigger the immigration enforcement
mechanism only after a detainee has been convicted.
10. Community policing is the concept that there must be a symbiotic relationship
between law enforcement authorities and the communities they protect, whereby the
community members report crimes and assist in the prosecution of crimes by testifying in
court, while the law enforcement authorities police neighborhoods and enforce the laws.
See infra Section IV.B.
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I. SECTION 287(G) AND THE STRUCTURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL
In the INA," the United States Congress structured the nation's
immigration laws. Congress legislated both criminal and civil
enforcement measures. Examples of criminal violations of the INA
are felonies and misdemeanors such as "the bringing in and harboring
of certain undocumented aliens," "the illegal entry of aliens," "the
reentry of aliens previously excluded or deported," "disobeying a
removal order," and "engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring
undocumented workers." 2 By contrast, "illegal presence in the U.S.
is a civil, not criminal, violation of the INA, and subsequent
deportation and associated administrative processes are civil
proceedings."13  The distinction between criminal and civil
enforcement is critical because states have historically participated in
the enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA through the
investigation and prosecution of violations and sharing findings with
federal immigration authorities. 14 State enforcement of INA criminal
provisions is "consistent with the state's police power to make arrests
for criminal acts and the expectation that states are expected to
cooperate in the enforcement of federal criminal laws,"15 whether or
not they are criminal immigration laws. On the other hand, states
traditionally have not played a role in enforcement of the civil
provisions-such as apprehending and removing deportable aliens-
that are construed to be within the exclusive purview of federal
immigration enforcement agencies." The distinction between state
enforcement of criminal versus civil provisions creates a "bifurcated
role for states and localities."17
Even though states historically have not played a role in the
enforcement of civil immigration provisions, Congress has blurred the
11. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
12. BLAS NUfNEZ-NETO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 4-5 & n.10
(2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
13. Id. at 4 & n.9.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 6-7 ("The civil provisions of the INA have been assumed to constitute a
pervasive and preemptive regulatory scheme-leaving no room for a direct state or local
role.").
17. Id. at 7 ("For example, state and local law enforcement officers cannot arrest
someone solely for illegal presence for the purpose of deporting them because it is a civil
violation, but they can arrest someone for the criminal offense of entering the country
illegally.").
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line between local enforcement of civil and criminal immigration
violations by providing an explicit delegation of authority for states to
exercise civil immigration law authority in section 287(g) of the INA.
Section 287(g) permits the voluntary collaboration between ICE and
state and local law enforcement agencies, including police and sheriff
departments and correctional facilities, in immigration enforcement.
Specifically, the section authorizes local officers or employees "to
perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United
States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to
detention centers),"'8 which are civil immigration powers that
historically belonged exclusively to the federal government. 9 Though
agreements under section 287(g) have been authorized since the 1996
amendments to the INA, ° local governments have only recently
begun entering into agreements with ICE.1
By entering into a 287(g) agreement with ICE, local law
enforcement officers are deputized by ICE to undertake immigration
enforcement responsibilities in addition to their regular
responsibilities.22  The agreements delineate the scope and
responsibilities of the local departments in enforcing immigration
law.' Officers who are chosen to participate are required to attend a
training session in immigration law enforcement.24 Officers who
complete the training course may then perform immigration law
enforcement functions, such as "investigat[ing] immigration
violations, ... collect[ing] evidence and assembl[ing] an immigration
case for prosecution or removal, . . . tak[ing] custody of aliens on
behalf of the federal government, and other general powers
18. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 5.
21. See infra note 27 for one reason for the recent use of 287(g) agreements
(describing the new urgency to enter agreements caused by the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001). 1 also briefly described another reason in the Introduction: the
frustration that state and local governments are having with the federal government's
failure to take action on undocumented immigration.
22. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 17.
23. "The written agreement must articulate the specific powers and duties that may
be, or are required to be, performed by the state officer, the duration of the authority, and
the position of the agent of the AG who is required to supervise and direct the individual."
CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 14; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g)(5)
(describing the requirements of the agreement).
24. See generally ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 6 (briefly describing the training program
officers must complete before being deputized under 287(g)).
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involv[ing] the routine enforcement of immigration laws."25 In their
immigration enforcement authority, local officers participating under
a 287(g) agreement have the same power as immigration officers "to
interrogate any alien or to interrogate any alien or person believed to
be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States., 26
Though initially unused for the several years following
authorization in 1996, there was "new urgency" to enter into 287(g)
agreements following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and
the Attorney General encouraged 287(g) agreements to assist the
country in its counter-terrorism efforts.27 Starting with the State of
Florida, the first jurisdiction to enter into an agreement with ICE in
August 2002, other state and local governments have followed suit,
tailoring the agreements to suit their local needs.28 The movement is
rapidly gaining momentum: only one agreement was entered into in
both 2002 and 2003; two and four agreements in 2005 and 2006,
respectively; twenty-six agreements in 2007; and twenty agreements in
2008 as of July 2, 2008. The separate totals for 2007 and 2008 are
more than double the amount of agreements entered into from 2002
to 2006 combined. 29  Though the grand total is currently fifty-five
agreements, other agreements are in the planning stages, with strong
25. The 287(g) Program: Ensuring the Integrity of America's Border Security System
through Federal-State Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Management,
Integration, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 50-57
(2005) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Professor Kris W. Kobach); see also CRS
REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 ("An officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is
determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in
the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across State lines to
detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political
subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.").
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2000).
27. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 17.
28. Id. at 14 ("Section 1357(g) allows for significant flexibility. It permits state and
local entities to tailor an agreement with the AG to meet local needs, contemplates the
authorization of multiple officers, and does not require the designated officers to stop
performing their local duties."). This flexibility is important, as this Recent Development
will later argue that any county considering a 287(g) program should take advantage of the
flexibility to optimize the desired immigration enforcement while avoiding the worrisome
consequences of 287(g) agreements. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
29. Eight of these agreements are with North Carolina law enforcement agencies:
Alamance County Sheriff's Office, Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office, Cumberland County
Sheriff's Office, Durham Police Department, Gaston County Sheriffs Office, Henderson
County Sheriff's Office, Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office, and Wake County Sheriff's
Office. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Partners (April 28, 2008),
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287-g.htm [hereinafter Partners].
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signals that the trend will continue to increase in popularity. 0
Hundreds of jurisdictions have inquired about creating agreements.3'
Two models of section 287(g) agreements have developed thus
far: the "officer model" and the "jail model. 3 2 The flexibility in
section 287(g) permits the different operational variations.33 Some
agreements, e.g., those adopted by the states of Florida and Alabama,
constitute the officer model, whereby field duty law enforcement
officers incorporate their immigration enforcement as part of the
performance of their normal field duties.34 Under the Florida
agreement, law enforcement officers have the authority to interrogate
aliens to determine probable cause for an immigration arrest, to
arrest aliens for civil and criminal immigrations violations (with no
need for a warrant), and to transport and detain aliens in ICE-
approved detention facilities."
By contrast, under the jail model, which is currently the
predominant model among local agencies, immigration enforcement
authority is limited to correctional officers in the jails. The role of
these officers in immigration enforcement begins after an
undocumented immigrant is arrested and brought to the jails for a
criminal violation unrelated to immigration status. A conviction is
unnecessary to trigger this inquiry; instead, when the immigrant is
processed at the detention facility following arrest, the officers within
the jail conduct the investigation into immigration status if there is a
suspicion that the immigrant is undocumented. The Arizona
Department of Corrections ("ADOC") followed this model when
structuring its September 2005 agreement.36 Under the ADOC jail
model, correctional officers may undertake the immigration
enforcement described above.37
The jail model is preferable to the officer model, at least insofar
as it is better able to avoid racial profiling concerns. Critics of the
officer model contend that empowering officers to inquire into the
30. Id. (listing the agreements entered into between ICE and different jurisdictions);
see also Kristin Collins, Sheriffs Help Feds Deport Illegal Aliens, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2007, at 1A ("An ICE spokesman said that a dozen agencies are
now enrolled and 40 more have expressed interest.").
31. Peter Whoriskey, States, Counties Begin to Enforce Immigration Law, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at Al.
32. See generally Arnold, supra note 5 (describing the two types of agreements).
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
34. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 124-27.
35. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 18 n.73.
36. See id. at 21.
37. See id. at 22 (citing Arizona's correctional officer model).
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immigration status of individuals they encounter during the course of
their regular field duties can lead to abuses. Data-to be discussed
below38-supports the contention that racial profiling abuses have
occurred when field officers enforce immigration laws. The jail
model, by contrast, isolates the arrest function from the immigration
enforcement function, arguably reducing the tendency for field
officers to selectively target suspected undocumented immigrants.
Still, the jail model is unable to completely avoid the potential for
racial profiling and cannot avoid other consequences such as the
negative impact on community policing and on local economies.39
II. THE USE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND
STATE ENCOURAGEMENT
Some North Carolina counties have adopted 287(g) agreements,
and the counties have thus far preferred the jail model. Mecklenburg
County was the first North Carolina county to adopt a 287(g)
agreement in 2006, followed by Alamance, Gaston, and Cabarrus
counties in 2007."0 The Durham Police Department has entered into
such an agreement,41 and Wake County is one of several other
counties that has recently entered into an agreement.42 The North
Carolina counties have all adopted the jail model, and the structure of
38. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing racial profiling statistics).
39. See infra Sections IV.B. and IV.C.
40. Mecklenburg County entered into its agreement on February 27, 2006, Alamance
County on January 10, 2007, Gaston County on February 22, 2007, and Cabarrus County
on August 2, 2007. See Partners, supra note 29.
41. See id.
42. See ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 6; see also Barbara Barrett, Patchwork of Rules
Affects Immigrants, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 9,2007, at 1A ("[S]everal
county sheriffs departments are among the dozens nationally that are signing up to work
with federal immigration enforcement agents."); Michael Biesecker, Wake Jail to Look for
Illegal Aliens, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), November 6, 2007, at 1A (describing
that, on November 5, 2007, Wake County Commissioners unanimously voted to authorize
the Sheriff's Office to enter into a 287(g) agreement, and Wake Sheriff Donnie Harrison
hoped that the program would be in place within six months); Press Release, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE and North Carolina Sheriffs Working
Together to Form Statewide Partnership (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
newsreleases/articles/071015carolinabeach.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (" 'North
Carolina sheriff's offices have demonstrated an unprecedented interest in partnering with
ICE,' noted Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for
ICE .... ICE received more 287(g) requests from agencies in North Carolina than any
other state.").
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the counties' arrest and detention systems are conducive to that
model. Police departments in North Carolina are responsible for
arresting individuals while sheriffs' departments are responsible for
detaining arrestees in their facilities. Thus, the police officer field
arrest is always distinct from the immigration enforcement function
conducted by the sheriff or jail administrator upon detention,
capitalizing on the separation of functions already present in the
North Carolina law enforcement system.
In addition to having arrest and detention systems that are
conducive to the jail model, legislation proposed in the North
Carolina General Assembly would further encourage North Carolina
counties to enter agreements pursuant to 287(g). First, House Bill
1950 (2007 Session) appropriates $750,000 and $1,000,000 for fiscal
years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, respectively, as grants to the North
Carolina Sheriffs' Association ("NCSA").43 The grants would be
used by NCSA to assist and to advise North Carolina sheriffs about
287(g) agreements, including assisting the sheriffs in negotiating an
agreement, and enabling sheriffs to send personnel to the 287(g)
training by reimbursing travel costs and salaries of officers while they
attend the 287(g) training." Second, House Resolution 2692, adopted
July 24, 2006, urges six additional (unspecified) North Carolina
counties to enter into 287(g) agreements, allowing "local officers to
identify persons not legally present in the United States and who have
previously been deported or who are persons wanted on outstanding
felony charges in North Carolina or another state. ' 45  All of the
positions urged for in the resolution have been filled (Alamance,
Gaston, Cabarrus, Wake, Henderson, and Cumberland).46
House Bill 55 (2007-2008 Session) would go a step further,
establishing a jail model type system statewide. 47  The bill would
mandate that when a person charged with a felony or an impaired
driving offense is confined in a jail facility, the jail administrator is to
make a "reasonable effort" to determine that person's nationality."
If lawful status cannot be verified by documents that the prisoner
possesses, a query shall be made to the Department of Homeland
43. H.R. 1950, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007).
44. H.R. 2692, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005). The resolution does not
specify which model-jail or officer-the counties should adopt. Id.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 40 (listing the dates when the counties entered into their
agreements).
47. H.R. 55, 2007 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007).
48. Id.
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Security ("DHS").49 If the DHS query determines that the prisoner
was not lawfully admitted to the United States, the jail administrator
is to notify DHS.5°
As evident from increased inquiries by North Carolina counties
and from recent North Carolina legislation, 287(g) agreements are
rapidly gaining momentum in North Carolina. Before their use
continues to spread across the state, a thorough and informed
discussion of their merits and deficiencies is needed. Sound public
policy regarding hot-button issues such as undocumented
immigration tends to be obscured and influenced by impassioned
rhetoric from all sides. At this juncture, it is imperative that North
Carolinians, regardless of their views on undocumented immigration,
understand the legitimate concerns motivating implementation of
287(g) agreements and what the likely positive and negative impact
will be on the communities that choose to adopt an agreement. Only
with an appropriate appreciation of all the implications should North
Carolina counties consider whether it is in the best interests of the
community to implement an agreement. The experience of the
counties that have implemented 287(g) agreements informs this
analysis.
III. THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA AND
BENEFITS OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS
Before discussing the consequences of 287(g) agreements as
experienced in North Carolina counties that have adopted them, it is
important first to understand the extent of immigration in North
Carolina. The foreign-born population in North Carolina is estimated
to be about 430,000 as of the 2000 Census.5' The estimated increase
in the foreign-born population between 1990 and 2000 was 273.7%.52
By contrast, there was only a seventeen percent increase in the North
Carolina native-born population over the same period.53 The
numbers represent that North Carolina over the period of 1990-2000
had the ninth-largest growth (in raw numbers) in foreign-born
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Federation for American Immigration Reform, Extended Immigration Data for
North Carolina, http://www.fairus.org/sitelPageServer?pagename=researchresearch8875
(last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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population and the fastest-growing foreign-born population in the
nation.54 In other words, "[niot since the days of British rule has such
a large portion of North Carolina's population originated overseas."55
Native-born North Carolinians are concerned with the effects of
such high levels of immigration.56 Many also support cracking down
on the major source-undocumented immigration-to combat the
effects of immigration on local communities. NC Listen, a North
Carolina immigration reform organization, states that "[t]oday's out-
of-control immigration affects homeland security, the unemployment
rate, our education system, health care, government budgets ... the
environment, crime and countless other areas of American life."5"
Regarding strains on the education system alone, NC Listen notes
that limited English proficient ("LEP") students in North Carolina
approximate 100,000 in number.58 Using a John Locke Foundation
calculation that the average yearly cost of K-12 education in North
Carolina is over $8,300 per student, NC Listen estimates the cost to
the state of educating LEP students at over $800 million per year,
over $500 million of which is estimated to be the cost of educating
LEP students who are dependents of undocumented immigrants.59
The Federation for American Immigration Reform also attributes
immigration in North Carolina to a decline in environmental health
and quality of life across the state, in terms of water resources, open
spaces, school overcrowding, traffic, sprawl, air pollution, waste,
poverty, and crowded housing.6"
A recent resolution that was to be voted on in Columbus County,
North Carolina expressed the situation even more starkly.61 The
resolution noted that undocumented immigration costs the State
nearly $250 million yearly for education, health care, and social
54. Id.
55. Richard Stradling, International Flavor Intensifies, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Sept. 3, 2003, at 4B.
56. See Barrett, supra note 42.
57. NC Listen, Why Should North Carolinians Be Concerned About Immigration?,
http://www.nclisten.com/statement.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
58. Id.
59. Id. It is worth noting that some dependents of undocumented immigrants may
actually be U.S. citizens by virtue of having been born here. For a conflicting calculation
of costs, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
60. Federation for American Immigration Reform, Immigration Impact: North
Carolina, http://www.fairus.org/site[PageServer?pagename=researchresearchf633 (last
visited Aug. 28, 2008).
61. Columbus County, N.C., Resolution to Adopt Policies and Provide Staff Direction
Relating to Illegal Residents in Columbus County (Nov. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.columbusco.org/minutes/2000s/2007-11-05.pdf, at 289-91 [hereinafter
Columbus County Resolution].
2008] 1721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
services.62 Second, the resolution expressed that communities are
struggling to cope with the population explosion caused by illegal
immigration.63 Further, the resolution attributed a "parade of
horribles" to the influx of undocumented immigrants to the state:
overcrowding in school classrooms, public parks, and recreation
facilities, depletion of affordable housing that was already in short
supply for low income citizens, "havoc and death" on the highways,
rise in the crime rate due to lack of comprehension of the English
language and inability to read and to follow establishes laws, decline
in public health because immigrants lack social and personal health
care standards, and the unavailability of jobs and negative impacts on
the state budget.64
The use of 287(g) agreements is principally targeted at the
criminal consequences of illegal immigration. Section 287(g)
agreements increase law enforcement capabilities by providing local
287(g) officers with "access to national databases to identify criminal
aliens and increased familiarity with patterns of alien and drug
smuggling., 65 In North Carolina, Mecklenburg County Sheriff Jim
Pendergraph stated, in support of the 287(g) agreement that
commenced in his county in May 2007, "We're protecting people
from illegal immigrants driving drunk and killing our families and
selling drugs to our children. 6 6 Pendergraph further noted that his
officers have so far found about 1,300 undocumented immigrants
"with criminal records or orders to leave the country, and more than
one hundred who had been deported before. 67 If the county lacked
access to the immigration database that the 287(g) agreement has
provided, "most of those people would have slipped through the
system., 68 A particularly noteworthy arrest in Mecklenburg County
involved a methamphetamine trafficker who had been removed from
62. Id. Contrast these figures with those mentioned supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
63. Columbus County Resolution, supra note 61, at 290.
64. Id. It is hard to tell whether undocumented immigrants are being "scapegoated"
and blamed for all manner of ills that North Carolina communities are experiencing.
However, as will be discussed below, infra notes 139-56, there is data to suggest that the
figures espoused here by NC Listen and by the Columbus County Resolution are
erroneous, and that the undocumented immigrant population is not a burden to the state,
certainly not to the degree claimed here.
65. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 141.
66. See Collins, supra note 30.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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the United States twenty-two prior times.69 ICE also boasts of
Mecklenburg County's success, noting that county deputies examined
over 1,600 arrestees and placed 853 of them in deportation
proceedings in the first nine months of the program.70
More generally, ICE notes that "287(g) partnerships continue to
generate hundreds of investigative leads, arrests and convictions for a
variety of federal and state charges."'" As of March 10, 2008, local
officers deputized by ICE through a 287(g) agreement identified
more than 45,000 individuals for possible immigration violations.
ICE reports that the 287(g) collaborations allow local and state
officers to have "necessary resources and latitude to pursue
investigations relating to violent crimes, human smuggling,
gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics
smuggling and money laundering. 73
It is hard to quarrel with the position that criminals that are in
the country without authorization-particularly violent criminals,
sexual predators, and drug traffickers-should be removed. As one
commentator noted:
You need not be a racist to agree that our country should
immediately deport any illegal immigrant who is arrested for a
violent crime. Letting illegals who commit crimes stay here,
preying on the innocent, helps no one, least of all the millions
of immigrants whose only goals are to work hard, stay out of
trouble, and feed their families.74
Alamance County Sheriff Terry Johnson nicely summarized the
appeal of the 287(g) agreement in his county: "It brings in money,
because the federal government pays about $66 a night for every
immigration detainee who stays in the jail. And it rids the county of
illegal immigrants, who ... sponge public resources and are more
prone to commit crimes than legal residents. '75  The Hispanic
population in Alamance County is one of the fastest-growing 76 in a
69. See J. Paige Straley, North Carolina Sheriff Uses 287(G) Powers, Acts Against
Illegal Immigration!, VDARE.COM, August 20, 2006, http://www.vdare.com/misc/
060920_straley.htm (summarizing an August 26, 2006 "town hall" meeting with Sheriff
Pendergraph and Congresswoman Sue Myrick).
70. See ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 6.
71. Id.
72. See Partners, supra note 29.
73. ICE Fact Sheet, supra note 6.
74. 'Sanctuary' Cities: No Questions Asked, THE WEEK MAGAZINE, Sept. 7, 2007, at
21.
75. See Collins, supra note 30.
76. Id.
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state that has the fastest-growing Hispanic population in the nation.77
From 1990 to 2005, Alamance County's Hispanic community
increased from 736 to nearly 14,000, a nineteen-fold increase.78
Predictably, the increase corresponded to tension with the native-
born population in Alamance County, a traditional, rural community
first settled by Europeans in the mid-1700s.79
Johnson's anti-illegal immigration posture resonates with his
constituents, as he was elected in 2006 to his second term as sheriff by
a wide margin.8" He lobbied for a new, $12 million, 240-bed jail so the
county's facility could become a hub for immigration detainees, and
bring revenue to the county from fees the federal government would
remit for the housing of immigrant detainees.81 The jail opened in
April 2007, and with its opening "and the leasing of added space to
the federal government," the reimbursement was expected to go up
to about $90-$100 daily per prisoner.82 As of July 2007, estimates
have placed the federal government reimbursement at $61 per day
per inmate housed at the jail, and "ICE detainees have already
brought in more than $183,000-about $30,561 in May and $152,622
in June. 83
To summarize, supporters of 287(g) agreements praise them for
their direct benefits-targeting criminal undocumented immigrants
that threaten community safety and removing them from the country
and bringing a stream of revenue through reimbursements for
detaining immigrants in the jails-and incidental benefits such as
reducing the burden on educational, healthcare, and social services
systems through deportation and the discouraging effect on
undocumented immigrants from coming to or staying in a
community.84
77. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
78. Roselee Papandrea, 'We Would Still Have Crime,' TIMES-NEWS (Burlington, NC),
Aug. 30, 2007, http://special.thetimesnews.com/immigration2007/083007-1.html.
79. A Brief History of Alamance County, http://www.alamance-nc.com/Alamance-
NC/The+Community/County+History.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
80. See Collins, supra note 30.
81. Id.
82. Lorraine Ahearn, Bigger Jail and Deportation Hub Worry Latinos, NEWS &
RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Mar. 18, 2007, at B1.
83. Hannah Winkler, Detainees Help Keep Jail Full, TIMES-NEWS (Burlington, N.C.),
July 22, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/ice_4201
article.html/jail detainees.html.
84. See Barrett, supra note 42 ("The intent is to discourage them and make them go
home."). To be sure, xenophobia and racism/ethnic bias also factor into support for the
287(g) agreements, though rarely are those sentiments expressed publicly. Alamance
Sheriff Johnson, in a moment of complete candor, once volunteered his conviction that:
"Their values are a lot different-their morals-than what we have here. In Mexico,
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IV. DRAWBACKS OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS
A. Racial Profiling
With an understanding of some of the benefits, a proper
appreciation of the drawbacks is necessary to assess the overall
impact of 287(g) agreements. Critics are chiefly concerned that state
and local police enforcement of immigration laws may lead to
possible civil rights violations." Specifically, the potential for racial
profiling-"the practice of targeting individuals for police or security
detention based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain
minority groups are more likely to engage in unlawful behavior "86 -is
worrisome. Within the context of immigration law enforcement,
racial profiling is the practice of targeting individuals on the basis that
they are more likely to "be present in the United States illegally.
87
Research has established that racial profiling indeed takes place
when state and local law officers undertake immigration enforcement.
The evidence has emerged even before 287(g)'s express authorization
for local immigration enforcement, as state and local law enforcement
there's nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old girl .... They do a lot of
drinking down in Mexico." Collins, supra note 30. Though the comment might be
shocking to some, it is unlikely that Johnson-a twice-elected Sheriff-is alone in this
conviction.
85. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes that "no
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying "the equal
protection of the laws" to "any person within [their] jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. Section 1983 provides a private right of action and a claim for monetary relief
against state or local officials who deprive persons of their federal constitutional rights.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Undocumented immigrants, typically members of minority
groups, may cause complications for officers trying to enforce immigration law because of
"the difficulty in identifying illegal aliens while at the same time avoiding the appearance
of discrimination based on ethnicity or alienage." CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25-26.
The consequence is a "high risk for civil rights violations ... if state and local police do not
obtain the requisite knowledge, training, and experience in dealing with the enforcement
of immigration laws. Id. at 26. The CRS report also notes that the courts have been
attentive to "[t]he prevalence of alleged civil rights violations and racial profiling among
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies." Id. (citing Department of Homeland
Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 66-69 (2003) (statement of the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Education Fund)).
86. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 26 & n.97 (citing statements of the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund before Congress to the extent of racial
profiling practices among federal and state officers).
87. Id.
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officers have been permitted to inquire about an immigrant's status
when conducting their normal duties as an incidental role to the
officers' general crime control authority.88 Even absent a 287(g)
agreement, when state or local officers detain an immigrant suspect
for a local violation, the officer may inquire into the suspect's
immigration status through a query to the Law Enforcement Support
Center ("LESC").89 The ICE representative fielding the query may
then place a detainer on the suspect to keep him or her in custody
until the immigrant's status can be determined.9" Indirect state and
local immigration enforcement by means of an immigration detainer
has been controversial. Allegations have surfaced regarding abuses
such as "state detentions premised on immigrant status alone and
custodial arrests for traffic violations or similar offenses as pretexts
for verifying an individual's status with immigration authorities."9 In
fact, "[p]ast allegations of abuse at times have led to states and
localities entering into consent decrees that strictly limit their role in
the enforcement of immigration law."92
Though the use of 287(g) in North Carolina counties is too recent
to permit systematic studies of racial profiling implications, the
experience of other counties with 287(g) agreements is instructive.
For example, in Davidson County, Tennessee-considered in many
ways to parallel Mecklenburg County, North Carolina93 -crime data
before and after the implementation of the 287(g) program in April
2006 signal that racial profiling is taking place there.94 Davidson
County has a similar structure to North Carolina counties in that the
police department is responsible for field enforcement of the law and
the sheriff's department is responsible for jailing arrested suspects.95
88. See id. at 3. 287(g) agreements extend an officer's incidental role in immigration
enforcement by providing an explicit delegation of immigration enforcement authority,
accompanied by the requisite training and oversight mandated by 287(g). See supra notes
23-26 and accompanying text.
89. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-4. The LESC is a twenty four hours a day,
seven days a week support center that assists local, state, and federal enforcement
agencies that are investigating or arresting foreign-born individuals involved in criminal
activity with immigration and identity information by information gathered from eight
DHS databases. See U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, Law Enforcement
Support Center, http://www.ice.gov/partners/lesc/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
90. However, Sheriff Pendergraph describes LESC query practice as "worthless and a
waste of time." See Straley, supra note 69.
91. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 3-4.
92. Id.
93. Telephone Interview with Stephen Fotopolous, Policy Director, Tennessee
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (Sept. 13, 2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Section II.
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Racial profiling is harder to detect in a program like Davidson
County's because it has adopted the jail model as North Carolina
counties have done. 6  Thus, an officer who selectively targets a
suspect on suspicion that he or she is undocumented-for example, a
Hispanic-looking suspect-has no authority to inquire into
immigration status and would likely not inquire about documented
status at the time of the arrest. However, if more Hispanics are
arrested-precisely to trigger the authority in the jail administrator to
make a status inquiry-a stronger case can be made that racial
profiling is occurring.
Davidson County data shows that arrest rates for driving without
a license for Hispanic defendants more than doubled after the
implementation of the 287(g) program, from 23.3% to 49.4%.' By
contrast, the arrests for driving without a license for non-Hispanic
defendants decreased from 76.7% to 50.6% over the same period.98
Driving without a license is an offense that typically merits a citation
(rather than an arrest).99 In Tennessee, as in North Carolina and
other states, undocumented immigrants are no longer permitted to
obtain driver's licenses.1" Thus, driving without a license has become
the crime du jour for undocumented immigrants. With a likelihood
that a Hispanic-looking driver on the road is undocumented as
compared to non-Hispanic-looking drivers, an officer can have a
strong suspicion that the driver does not possess a license. Since
driving without a license is a crime that can trigger an arrest instead
of the issuance of a citation-though it is typically punishable by
citation-officers can pull over Hispanic-looking drivers with a fair
measure of certainty that the officer can arrest the driver and trigger
the accompanying status check in the jails. Even if the driver ends up
possessing a license, there is little to no cost for the officer to stop the
driver at the outset anyway, simply on the suspicion that the driver
does not possess a license.
Again, while the jail model in place in North Carolina counties,
including Davidson County, better avoids racial profiling concerns,
selective arrests by field officers to trigger status inquiries at the jail
96. See Telephone Interview with Stephen Fotopolous, supra note 93.
97. TENN. IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., ARRESTS FOR No DRIVERS
LICENSE BY ETHNICITY AND RACE: A COMPARISON OF MAY-JULY 2006 TO MAY-JULY
2007 1 (July 31, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
98. Id.
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-207(a)(1) (2004 & Supp. 2007); see also Telephone
Interview with Stephen Fotoplous, supra note 93.
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing recent North Carolina law).
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may nonetheless establish a pattern of racial profiling. Despite an
absence of data in North Carolina counties, there are reasons to
believe that racial profiling practices are occurring. In Mecklenburg
County, critics of 287(g) agreements contend that the agreement
there "is contributing to a discriminatory climate in which Hispanic
drivers feel as if they are being 'hunted' by the police."'' Hispanics
are concerned that police officers are more likely to arrest them for
minor traffic violations knowing that the arrest will trigger the 287(g)
authority of officers in the jails to check immigration status and
possibly lead to deportation.'02 North Carolina counties considering
287(g) agreements should be attentive to the potential for racial
profiling, not just because of the accompanying legal liability that may
result from a racial profiling pattern, 13 but also because racial
profiling practices-as played out in arrests for violations of traffic
crimesln-can distract from enforcement of other serious criminal
offenses.105
B. Community Policing and Crime
Beyond racial profiling, a second overriding concern is the effect
of 287(g) agreements and practices on community policing.
Community policing emphasizes "strengthening relationships
between police and the people they are charged with protecting. '" 106
The premise is that trust and cooperation between the police and the
community is necessary for the protection of the community.
Whereas community members depend on police to provide protective
services, the police depend on community members to report crimes
and to serve as witnesses in the prosecution of criminals. The City of
Chicago provides an example of a harmonious community policing
101. Whoriskey, supra note 31.
102. Id.
103. For an example of how a pattern of racial profiling can lead to legal liability for
law enforcement agencies, see Am. Civ. Liberties Union, NAACP Ask Court to Approve
"DWB" Class Action Lawsuit Against Maryland State Police, Mar. 8, 2000,
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/15924prs200003O8.html (describing a class
action lawsuit against the Maryland State Police), and Am. Civ. Liberties Union,
Landmark Settlement Reached With Maryland State Police In "Driving While Black"
Case, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/34753prs2008O4O2.html
(describing the settlement of the suit).
104. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
106. David Hench, Building Trust vs. Checking for Visas: Making Police Enforce
Immigration Laws Could Actually Detract from Crime Fighting, Some Officials Say,
PORTLAND PREss HERALD, Mar. 29, 2004, at lB.
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relationship between law enforcement and immigrant communities in
the absence of a 287(g) agreement. To promote community policing,
the city forbids its employees, including law enforcement officers,
from inquiring into immigration status. °7 One officer praised the
policy for enabling him to form a strong bond with his community. 108
The officer was comfortable playing soccer with children in the
community and the residents felt comfortable sharing information
about local gang members and drug dealers. 1 9
Critics of 287(g) agreements argue that state and local
enforcement of immigration law "would undermine the relationship
between local law enforcement agencies and the communities they
serve." 110 The community trust has often been difficult to build, in
particular among immigrant communities."' It is not only 287(g)
critics that worry about the community policing implications, but law
enforcement authorities are also concerned about undermining the
relationship established with the immigrant community and realize
that such policies would have a chilling effect on the reporting of
crime."' An inevitable consequence, the theory goes, would be an
increase of crime against the immigrant community;" 3
[f]or example, potential witnesses and victims of crime may be
reluctant to come forward to report crimes in fear of actions
that might be taken against them by immigration officials.
[The critics] assert that the trust between immigrants and local
authorities is tenuous and that such a policy [of local
immigration enforcement] could exacerbate the negative
relationship.'
To illustrate the extent to which the law enforcement community is
split on the issue of local enforcement of immigration law generally,
107. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 122 & n.66 for a brief discussion of Chicago's and
other jurisdictions' "non-cooperation policies." Critics of non-cooperation policies argue
that the policies encourage illegal immigration, while the supporters argue that the policies
"are called for by resource and legal constraints, the need to avoid the disruption of
critical municipal services, or basic human rights considerations." CRS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 23.
108. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 122.
109. Id.
110. See CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 26-27 & n.99.
111. See CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL, MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION, M.C.C.
IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5-6 (2006),
http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org/pdfpublic/mcc-position -statement-revised-cef.pdf.
112. Tiffany Walters Kleinert, Comment, Local and State Enforcement of Immigration
Law: An Equal Protection Analysis, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103,1114 (2006).
113. Id. at 1114-15.
114. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27 & n.100.
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including the use of 287(g) agreements, members of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP") disagree as to its value, the
consequence of which is that IACP has never expressed a preference
one way or the other."5
Government officials contend that the fear of undermining
community policing is overstated. Alamance County Lieutenant
Robert Wilborn asserts that the 287(g) enforcement would only be
triggered after an immigrant has committed two crimes: illegal entry
into the country and whatever offense precipitated the arrest.11 6
Alamance County Sheriff Johnson also assures that there are no
intentions of targeting illegal immigrants generally, but that the
program would merely allow the county to check the status of those
arrested for other crimes. 7  The logical implication is that
undocumented immigrants that are otherwise law-abiding residents
have nothing to worry about. But the message seems to be lost in
translation.
Even those who oppose the use of 287(g) agreements support
removing undocumented immigrants that commit crimes. However,
the fear that the process of deportation can be triggered for relatively
minor infractions such as failure to appear in court for a speeding
violation or having an expired driver's license makes undocumented
immigrants distrustful of the entire law enforcement establishment. 8
115. INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION
ISSUES 3 (July 2007), http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/publications/policechiefs
guidetoimmigration.pdf.
The IACP is well aware of the controversy surrounding the question of whether
state, tribal and local law enforcement should be involved in the enforcement of
federal immigration law. This document is not intended to rule on this
fundamental philosophical question. It is the IACP's belief that the question of
state, tribal or local law enforcement's participation in immigration enforcement is
an inherently local decision that must be made by a police chief, working with his
or her elected officials, community leaders and citizens.
Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 5, at 123 & nn. 72-74 (citing U.S. Representative Michael
D. Rogers (R-AL) Holds Hearing on Border Security Partnerships Before the Subcomm.
on Management, Integration, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Chief Jimmy Fawcett, Sixth Vice President, International
Association of Chiefs of Police)); Whoriskey, supra note 31.
116. Ahearn, supra note 82 ("Before they hit our radar, they would have to have
committed two crimes: One is being in the country illegally, two is whatever offense
they've been picked up for. We're not going out targeting illegal aliens. We're only
targeting criminal aliens.").
117. Collins, supra note 30 (" 'We do not choose the race, financial status or color of
those individuals who violate the law,' Johnson said.").
118. Ahearn, supra note 82 ("They came here for the opportunity to work. Now, they
don't know who to trust. They're afraid of the system.").
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So despite law enforcement assurances of a continuing relationship of
trust and cooperation with the undocumented immigrant community,
the actual-if not intended-effect of 287(g) agreements is to alienate
undocumented immigrants and to undermine vital community
policing. The Congressional Research Service ("CRS") report notes
that critics are concerned that "allowing state and local law
enforcement to enforce such laws would undermine public safety and
could force many undocumented aliens to go underground, thus
making it more difficult to solicit their cooperation in criminal
investigations, which could also include terrorist-related
investigations."19
Nolo Martinez, formerly the state's director of Hispanic affairs
and currently with the Center for New North Carolinians, agrees,
stating that "the program will create fear ... and discourage
Hispanics from calling the police., 12' Troubling reports have emerged
recently regarding how fearful undocumented immigrants have been
in cooperating with local authorities. At the scene of an accident, one
of the drivers-an undocumented immigrant who was not responsible
for the accident-ran away from the scene for fear that he would be
arrested and have his status checked anyway.121 Another incident
involved two undocumented immigrant males who were shot in a
drive-by shooting. They called the police, yet they themselves were
arrested and currently await deportation. 2 2  A more troubling
situation involved a home invasion and gang-rape in which the family
of the victim, the daughter, refused to cooperate in the
investigation. 3
The consequences of unreported or unprosecuted criminal
activity extend beyond the immigrant victims; the community as a
whole suffers. "What if a U.S.-born citizen is the victim of a crime?
... If an undocumented person is a witness, how willing will they be
119. See CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27 & n.102.
120. See Collins, supra note 30.
121. Ahearn, supra note 81. At this point, it is worth reiterating that an arrest need not
lead to a conviction before the deportation machinery is triggered. So, even if the driver
were arrested and ultimately not found at fault or convicted for any offense, he could
nonetheless face deportation because an immigration status check upon his detention at
the jail would reveal undocumented status. "[Wake County Sheriff Donnie] Harrison has
promised that only immigrants arrested and booked into the county jail would be subject
to immigration scrutiny. But, ... just because you've been arrested doesn't mean you're
guilty. Either way, it's the same ticket back to Mexico or Central America." Ruth
Sheehan, Jail ID Program Stirs Fear, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 9, 2007, at
lB.
122. Sheehan, supra note 121.
123. Ahearn, supra note 82.
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to come forward?, 124  Consider the unfortunate gang-rape scenario
mentioned above: the perpetrators remain on the streets and
continue to pose a threat to others, citizen and undocumented
families alike. 125
Critics also fear that 287(g) agreements will reallocate finite
police resources towards the enforcement and prosecution of low-
priority crimes, such as driving without a license and other minor
traffic violations.'26 Meanwhile, the resources needed for the
enforcement of more serious crimes-violent crimes, gang activity,
drug trafficking-will decrease correspondingly. The CRS report
reflects this concern.127
[Critics] contend that such action could result in the reduction
of local law enforcement resources available for other purposes
and constitute a cost shift [of federal immigration law
enforcement] onto state and local law enforcement agencies.
According to some, local jurisdictions are already witnessing a
depletion of traditional funding to fight crime .... These critics
also contend that there could be a de-emphasis on certain types
of criminal investigations in an effort to focus on enforcing
immigration law, which would divert law enforcement
authorities from their primary duties.12
124. See Barrett, supra note 42.
125. Charlotte Mayor Pat McCrory supports law enforcement officers checking the
immigration status of the crime victims and the witnesses themselves, but Police Chief
Darrel Stephens has resisted. Editorial, Mayoral Meddling: Back Off, Mr. Mayor. Chief,
Stick to Your Guns, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 26, 2006, at 12A. A related
consequence of 287(g) agreements that further undermines criminal enforcement is within
the domestic violence realm. Domestic violence perpetrated against undocumented
immigrant women is a well-reported phenomenon. The consensus is that undocumented
domestic violence victims suffer a cycle of violence that is exacerbated by their
undocumented status. An abuser commonly exploits the woman's immigration status to
exert further control by threatening the woman with deportation or by threatening not to
file the required paperwork for the woman to obtain lawful status. See generally Gail
Pendleton, Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Its Effects on Victims of
Domestic Violence, AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/DVPage/DVSA%20CLEAR%20article.doc
(last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (discussing drawbacks to the 287(g) agreements while focusing
briefly on consequences within the realm of domestic violence perpetrated against
undocumented immigrant women).
126. A criminal defense attorney in Alamance County notes that one of his clients was
a nineteen-year-old without a criminal record who did not stop for a police siren. See
Collins, supra note 30. Another client was arrested for driving without a license and
running a stop sign. Id.
127. CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27.
128. Id.
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Nolo Martinez also predicts that, as counties try to earn profits
from detaining undocumented immigrant inmates, 129 they will fill their
jails with Hispanics who have conmmitted misdemeanors and traffic
violations.13 ° If the prediction is accurate, jail space that could be
used to detain drug traffickers, sexual predators, and violent criminals
will instead be used to house undocumented immigrants who have
merely committed minor traffic infractions. A community
considering a 287(g) program should recognize this reality and
prioritize its law enforcement interests accordingly, recognizing that,
in the context of criminal law enforcement, 287(g) agreements are
likely to be counterproductive.
As exemplified by the foregoing discussion, the issue of 287(g)
community policing and crime implications is multifaceted. One
more point merits serious attention. Studies of undocumented
immigration incarceration rates have shown that undocumented
immigrants do not commit crimes at a disproportionally higher rate
than the native-born population. For example, between 2002 and
2006, Hispanics comprised ten percent of Alamance County's
population and accounted for twelve percent of the county's criminal
caseload.' A report by the Immigration Policy Center confirms that
incarceration rates among immigrants are the lowest for every ethnic
group without exception and even suggests that the presence of
immigrants in a community can help to reduce crime rates.32
129. See supra notes 80-82 (discussing federal reimbursements to counties detaining
undocumented immigrants).
130. See Collins, supra note 30; supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing
the revenue stream that detaining undocumented immigrants provides).
131. See Collins, supra note 30. The twelve percent figure may itself be inflated and
misrepresentative of the actual extent of crime committed by Hispanics in Alamance
County if there was already a tendency to over-prosecute Hispanics suspects.
132. RUBEN RUMBAUT & WALTER EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MYTH
OF IMMIGRANT; CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION
RATES AMONG NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 1 (2007).
[F]or every ethnic group without exception, incarceration rates among young men
are lowest for immigrants, even those who are the least educated ... [T]hese
patterns have been observed consistently over the last three decennial censuses, a
period that spans the current era of mass immigration ... The problem of crime in
the United States is not "caused" or even aggravated by immigrants, regardless of
their legal status. But the misperception that the opposite is true persists among
policymakers, the media, and the general public, thereby undermining the
development of reasoned public responses to both crime and immigration.
Id. at 1. "[I]mmigration is arguably one of the reasons that crime rates have dropped in
the United States over the past decade and a half. Indeed, a further implication of this
evidence is that if immigrants suddenly disappeared and the country became immigrant-
free (and illegal-immigrant free), crime rates would likely increase." Id. at 14; see
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C. Expenses and Economic Impact
The expense associated with 287(g) agreements is the final topic
of discussion within the context of evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of 287(g) agreements. As previously mentioned,
287(g) agreements can bring in revenue to a county.133 Nevertheless,
the statutory language of 287(g) clearly states that the local
government is responsible for all expenses incurred.3 4  Some of the
costs include "costs of transportation to the training location and
providing temporary replacements for law enforcement personnel
who are participating in the training. 1 35  Mecklenburg County
estimated that training and equipment for the 287(g) program would
cost about $650,000.136 The county planned to recoup this expense
through federal government reimbursements for detaining
undocumented immigrants in the local prison facilities,137 though it is
not entirely clear whether the reimbursements from the federal
government will balance out the expenses. The Mecklenburg County
Sheriff has stated that-despite the revenue-the detention of
undocumented immigrants for immigration law violations is
burdening his county because ICE cannot process immigrant
detainees quickly enough.'38 Some counties with 287(g) agreements
Jacqueline Hagan & Scott Phillips, Border Blunders: The Unanticipated Human and
Economic Costs of the U.S. Approach to Immigration Control, 1986-2007, 7
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y. 83, 85-86 (2008). "Collectively, criminological research
suggests that enforcement activities and public perception are based, at least in part, on
faulty and misguided assumptions about the behavior of immigrants. Most immigrants
are, in the words of sociologist Robert Merton, 'conformists' who seek to achieve the
American Dream through hard work and self-sacrifice." Id. at 91. "[P]eople living in
immigrant neighborhoods are less prone to violence than similarly situated people living in
non-immigrant neighborhoods." Id.
133. See supra notes 80-82, 109 and accompanying text.
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000).
135. Hearings, supra note 25.
136. Michelle Crouch, Local Action on Immigrants: Mecklenburg County Deputies to
Screen People Charged with Crimes for Illegal Status, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 7,
2006, at 1A. Similar numbers are estimated in Wake County's upcoming implementation
of a 287(g) agreement: "An estimated $629,316 in the first year, ... [a]bout $539,341
annually in future years. The department can apply for federal reimbursements of $55 per
day for each undocumented immigrant held in the county jail awaiting transport to a
federal facility to await deportation." Biesecker, supra note 42.
137. Crouch, supra note 136.
138. Straley, supra note 69.
So many illegal immigrant criminals have been identified through my 287(g)
program, it is causing me a jail space problem. One of the agreements with ICE in
the beginning was for their removal of the identified offenders as soon as possible.
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are also starting to observe that ICE has not been submitting the
reimbursements as expected. 139
Another important economic consideration is that immigrants-
even undocumented ones-contribute to local economies and can
actually help to revitalize them. Through a taxpayer identification
number,' 40 many undocumented immigrants pay taxes and contribute
to the social security system, even though they cannot be beneficiaries
of many public benefits programs. 4' Undocumented immigrants also
have purchasing power and can stimulate a local economy. 142 For
example, a recent study has comprehensively detailed the economic
I don't think even they foresaw the numbers we would be dealing with. The
Removal and Detention Division of ICE is overwhelmed by the numbers we are
generating for removal in Mecklenburg County alone.
Id. The jail space problem relates to the crime control consequences mentioned above. If
the county can obtain revenue for housing detained immigration law violators-revenue
that they do not obtain for housing garden-variety criminals that have committed crimes
more serious than immigration or traffic violations-there may be an incentive to
incarcerate immigrants over the garden-variety criminals. Even if the economics do not
factor into the equation, fewer jail spaces from the already high presence of immigrants in
the Mecklenburg jails could nonetheless result in serious-non-immigrant--offenders
remaining on the streets.
139. See Jennifer M. Hansen, Comment, Sanctuary's Demise: The Unintended Effects
of State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Law, 10 SCHOLAR 289,322-23 (2008).
Congress appropriated $5 million for the 287(g) program in fiscal [year] 2006 and
$5.4 million in fiscal [year] 2007, not including a supplemental appropriation in late
fiscal [year] 2006 of $10.1 million, available through the end of fiscal [year] 2007.
Since these numbers did not cover the bulk of 287(g) expenses, states and localities
that have entered into these MOAs are already feeling the pressure of these extra
costs in their budget. The federal government has also overlooked the salaries for
each officer needed to replace another who has gone to training or who has
completed the program and is working with an ICE task force, as many do.
Id. at 324 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
140. See Internal Revenue Service, Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN),
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96287,00.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
141. See LEIGHTON KU ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
NONCITIZENS' USE OF PUBLIC BENEFITS HAS DECLINED SINCE 1996: RECENT REPORT
PAINTS MISLEADING PICTURE OF IMPACT OF ELIGIBILITY RESTRICTIONS ON
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 1 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/4-14-03wel.pdf ("The 1996 welfare
law made many legal noncitizens ineligible for certain public benefit programs, including
Medicaid, Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).").
142. Latin American born workers earned an estimated $450 billion in annual gross
income in 2004 and spent ninety percent of the money within the United States. INTER-
AM. DEv. BANK, SENDING MONEY HOME: REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA FROM
THE US 1 (2004), http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=547214.
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contributions of Hispanics-the majority of undocumented
immigrants-to the North Carolina economy.
43
Far from being a burden to the state,1" North Carolina's
Hispanic population, through purchases and taxes, contributed over
$9 billion to the state's economy in 2004.141 Assuming immigration
and spending patterns continue, the yearly economic impact of
Hispanic spending could total $18 billion by 2009.146 The annual
contribution of Hispanics to North Carolina taxes is about $756
million, while the state spends about $817 million annually to provide
education, health care, and correctional services to its Hispanic
population. 147 The cost per Hispanic resident was calculated to be
$102 though the study did not mention the figures for the native-born
population.148  However, the study cautions that despite the $61
million, deficit that the state bears in providing services to the
Hispanic population:
[T]he net cost to the state budget must be seen in the broader
context of the aggregate benefits Hispanics bring to the state's
economy. Above and beyond their direct and indirect impacts
on North Carolina business revenues, Hispanic workers
contribute immensely to the state's economic output and cost
competitiveness in a number of key industries. Without
Hispanic labor, for example, the state's construction industry
143. JOHN D. KASARDA & JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR., FRANK HAWKINS KENAN INST.
OF PRIVATE ENTER., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE HISPANIC POPULATION ON THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (2006).
144. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. Ironically, deportation of an
undocumented immigrant actually increases the chances of dependency on state support.
This is because "deportation severs the migrant from his or her work and, thus, from
income-generating activities," and "the separation poses huge economic costs to the family
members in the U.S. household, who ironically may become more dependent on the U.S.
government and taxpayers for assistance in the absence of the breadwinner." Hagan &
Phillips, supra note 132, at 90.
145. KASARDA & JOHNSON, JR., supra note 143, at ix.
North Carolina Hispanics had an estimated total after-tax income of $8.3 billion in
2004. With about 20 percent of that total sent home to Latin America, saved, or
used for interest payments, the remaining spending had a total impact of $9.2
billion on the state-much of which is concentrated in the major metropolitan
areas along the Interstate 40/Interstate 85 corridor, but which also supports
businesses in every part of the state.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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output would likely be considerably lower and the state's total
private-sector wage bill as much as $1.9 billion higher. 149
The study further notes that the full potential of Hispanic buying
power is not realized, because many communities-in particular those
in rural areas-lack the "retail and service facilities to meet the
consumer needs of Hispanics."'50  North Carolina businesses can
profit "if they can find ways to ... tap this growing market." '151 The
authors find further opportunities for economic growth through
promoting Hispanic entrepreneurship'52 but warn that barriers such as
"complex English-language only legal and reporting documents [and]
lack of credit histories" impede Hispanics from establishing
businesses.'53 The study notes that the growth of exports from North
Carolina to regions in Latin America have grown dramatically in
recent years, creating nearly 70,000 jobs and contributing $231 million
to state and local taxes. 54 Given North Carolina's rapidly-increasing
Hispanic population, there is also potential for Latin American-
headquartered businesses to invest in North Carolina to serve the
Hispanic population and, as a consequence, to boost the state's
economy.' The authors conclude, stating: "Taking advantage of
these business opportunities could boost North Carolina's
employment growth and overall economic prosperity considerably for
decades to come.' '1 56
As discussed above, proponents of 287(g) agreements argue that
a jurisdiction adopting a program stands to gain financially. 57
However, sound economic data belies this argument, demonstrating
that undocumented immigrants make positive contributions to local
economies that would be diminished if 287(g) campaigns to identify
and to deport undocumented immigrants spread.5 8 To the extent
that the economic impact of the undocumented population is used to
support the implementation of 287(g) agreements, North Carolina
counties considering an agreement should not be tempted by
speculative guarantees that money will flow to their treasuries from
the housing of detainees at the expense (literally) of the substantial
149. Id. at ix-x.
150. Id. at x.
151. Id.
152. Id. ("The potential for further Hispanic business development is immense.")
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 141-57.
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contributions that Hispanics make, and can continue increasingly to
make, to state and local economies.
To the extent that a North Carolina county considers and decides
to implement a 287(g) program, the county should employ the
flexibility of the statutory language to structure a program that
optimizes the enforcement potential while minimizing the
problematic consequences. 159 The best way to accomplish this goal
would be to permit enforcement of immigration law at the local level,
but only after an undocumented immigrant that is arrested is also
convicted. This "conviction" model would authorize only post-
conviction immigration enforcement and strikes a balance between
accomplishing the desired need for enforcement and minimizing the
most problematic features of 287(g) agreements.
Los Angeles County has been the only jurisdiction thus far to
adopt this variant of 287(g) agreement. 60 Under the Los Angeles
County agreement, two investigators at the county jail interview
prisoners who identify themselves as foreign-born upon the prisoners'
release from custody after serving a sentence.161 The Los Angeles
County Sheriff initially urged the use of an agreement that would
permit questioning foreign-born detainees upon their arrival at the
jail, meaning that detainees who were either acquitted of a criminal
charge or were released by the court without a jail sentence would be
investigated.162 The Sheriff was motivated by the wish "to increase
reimbursement to the county from the federal government under the
State Criminal Alien Assistance Program ("SCAAP"),"' 16 3 though he
later conceded that increased reimbursement through participation in
a 287(g) agreement would be speculative."
The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors instead approved
a limited agreement that rejected the Sheriff's proposal to allow for
interviewing detainees upon their first arrival at the jail, "specifically
direct[ing] that interviews under the MOU take place only after
detainees have been convicted of a criminal offense."' 65 The board
was also concerned by the fact that-"[s]ince only individuals with
misdemeanor convictions serve time at the county jail"-the
159. See supra note 28 (describing the flexibility permitted by 287(g)).
160. Linton Joaquin, L.A. County to Enter Limited MOU with ICE to Permit
Immigration Enforcement at County Jail, IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE (Feb. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/ad085.htm.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
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agreement would target individuals convicted of only minor offenses,
and thus the board conditioned their approval on receiving a list of
the criminal offenses applicable under the agreement, as well as a
specific evaluation of "the different kinds of convictions for which the
program is used."'" The board also specified that no county funds
were to be used to cover the expenses incurred under the agreement;
rather, only funds remitted by the federal government-either
through SCAAP or some other mechanism-would be used to sustain
the program's operations, and the extension of the six-month pilot
agreement depended on the county obtaining additional federal
funding.1 67
From an economic perspective, the Los Angeles County
agreement is the most prudent method of structuring a 287(g)
agreement. The agreement is conditioned upon receipt of funds from
the federal government to reimburse the cost of detaining and
processing undocumented immigrants, and it only authorizes local
enforcement of immigration law to the extent that the federal
government funds. This structure avoids the local jurisdiction
incurring expenses for what is essentially a federal responsibility. As
mentioned earlier, the promise of federal government
reimbursements for detaining undocumented immigrants has been
used to support the implementation of 287(g) agreements, 68 but also
mentioned was the fact that local agencies cannot rely on these
reimbursements. Under a conviction model such as the one in place
in Los Angeles County, a North Carolina jurisdiction would not need
to rely on speculative and irregular reimbursements from the federal
government for the detention of immigrant suspects.
A conviction model agreement would minimize the expenses
incurred by immigration enforcement under a 287(g) agreement: the
county would save money by needing fewer local officers to be
trained to perform immigration functions and fewer immigrants
would be processed within the jail facilities, lessening the burden on
county jail facilities and the strain on ICE to proceed with the
deportation mechanism for people that are not convicted.
Furthermore, fewer undocumented immigrants would be deported,
alleviating the burden on the state created by the absence of an
166. Id.
167. Id; see also CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 20 ("The MOA also specifies that the
LASD has sole discretion to terminate the MOA should the State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program funding fall below an acceptable level or is terminated in its
entirety.").
168. See supra 75, 81-83 and accompanying text.
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undocumented parent or primary earner. Finally, the purchasing
power and labor contributions of undocumented immigrants would
continue to enhance local and state economies.
A conviction model of immigration enforcement would also
mitigate the impact of a racial profiling practice. Even though local
officers may still selectively target suspects based on a suspicion of
undocumented status, racial profiling for the purpose of detention
and deportation would have less of an effect because the mechanism
of the criminal justice system would come into play. In other words,
an undocumented immigrant that is detained may take advantage of
his rights to legal representation and the guarantee of "innocent until
proven guilty" '169 before immigration enforcement is triggered. As
mentioned earlier, under the system in place in most jurisdictions
where mere arrest and detention at a jail facility triggers the
enforcement function, an undocumented immigrant may be deported
even if he or she is ultimately acquitted of the charge that led to the
arrest in the first place.
Under a conviction model, a pattern or practice of selectively
targeting a Hispanic-looking person for arrest based on racial or
ethnic animus may still emerge. But even if it does, the criminal
defense system can serve as a buffer to prevent the deportation of
individuals who are not found to be a threat to the community after
an acquittal or dismissal of charges. A jurisdiction could go a step
further to specify convictions for which types of crimes would trigger
the immigration enforcement mechanism.17°
Within the realm of community policing and crime, a conviction
model would not reallocate resources to lower-priority crimes, and
the resources for immigration enforcement will only be used on
immigrants that are convicted of a crime. A post-conviction system
169. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.").
170. From the subjective perspective of the officer on the street, a conviction system
could also lessen the tendency to selectively target an immigrant who appears to be
undocumented. For example, it would be easy for an officer to pull over a Hispanic-
looking driver and arrest him for driving without a license, at which time his immigration
status would be checked and he would begin to undergo processing for deportation. It
would be easy for officers in a community to do this en masse, leading to the removal of
many undocumented immigrants. However, if a conviction system were utilized, the
incentive to racially profile Hispanics would be lessened, because arresting an
undocumented immigrant for the purpose of having him deported would not be as
expeditious, and would not necessarily guarantee the outcome that the immigrant would
be deported at all.
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would also make undocumented immigrants more willing to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of crimes because they would know
that the only time they could possibly be deported would be after
both an arrest and a conviction for a crime. Currently, a mere
arrest-with a threshold of only probable cause as opposed to guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt-can trigger the immigration
enforcement, so many undocumented immigrants are fearful and
distrustful of the police and avoid the authorities altogether."' A
conviction model could allay those fears to some extent because
victims or witnesses would know that even if they were accidentally
or mistakenly arrested, the fact that a conviction could not stand-
and that processing for deportation would not occur-could diminish
the concern. Of course, there is always the potential that a conviction
model would not accomplish the purpose of promoting community
policing better than an officer or jail model agreement, which is one
reason that this paper urges North Carolina counties to reject 287(g)
agreements. But to the extent that a jurisdiction wishes to enter into
a 287(g) agreement, a conviction-model agreement is far preferable.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, a conviction model is preferable to a jail or officer
model agreement by being more economically prudent, by better
avoiding a climate of community policing concerns, by containing the
effects of a racial profiling practice, and by permitting undocumented
immigrants to stay and to contribute to the economy. The conviction
model as adopted by Los Angeles County strikes an appropriate
balance: undocumented immigrants who genuinely pose a threat to
the community will be removed from the country, undocumented
immigrants who are otherwise law-abiding will be able to stay, to earn
a living, and to have a harmonious relationship with police
authorities, and local communities will benefit from better
community policing, the labor and economic contributions of the
immigrant population, and the use of federal funding to undertake
the local immigration enforcement.
The preceding discussion has illuminated that, despite useful and
desirable consequences of local immigration enforcement under a
287(g) agreement, there are many problematic consequences that a
county should consider before entering an agreement with ICE. This
paper, in agreement with critics of 287(g) agreements, contends that
171. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
2008] 1741
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the problematic consequences outweigh the beneficial consequences
such that a jurisdiction should reject a 287(g) agreement.172 Though
the decision is-and should be-ultimately left to the jurisdiction's
sound judgment through its elected representation, this Recent
Development articulates and urges North Carolina counties to
consider the various consequences that follow from a 287(g)
agreement. To the extent that a North Carolina county considers and
decides to implement a 287(g) agreement, the county should employ
the flexibility within the statutory language of 287(g) to adopt a
conviction model agreement that closely mirrors that of the Los
Angeles County agreement with a structure that optimizes the
enforcement potential while minimizing the problematic
consequences.
JASON G. IDILBI
172. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 141 (discussing Virginia's rejection of a state-wide
287(g) program for racial profiling and community policing concerns).
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